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I. INTRODUCTION
How should moral conflicts in politics be resolved? One way of
answering this question is to begin by considering how not to resolve moral
conflicts in politics. For example: avoid taking a conflict to court if
possible. This is not always possible, and it would be better in any case to
understand the advantages as well as the disadvantages of different
responses to moral conflicts in politics.
If we can understand what is missing from the most commonly
recommended responses to moral conflicts in politics, then we can
construct a more defensible response, one that captures the strengths while
avoiding the weaknesses of the other ways. In this Essay, I will not start
from scratch in constructing such a response. Rather, I will draw upon the
conception of deliberative democracy that Dennis Thompson and I defend
in Democracy and Disagreement, pursuing parallels between our
conception and insights of dispute resolution.'
What is a moral conflict in politics? A moral conflict in politics is any
public controversy where important interests or ideals of many individuals
are at stake and some public institution is called upon to render a decision
or a series of decisions in order to resolve the conflict. Most political
controversies are moral conflicts.
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There are three theoretically prominent frameworks for resolving moral
conflicts in politics that I discuss in this Essay, each of which helps to
highlight elements of a more defensible framework. The first framework is
procedural: let the majority decide. The second is substantive: maximize
social welfare. The last is also substantive, but it rejects the second: protect
individual rights.
An examination of the logic of these three frameworks for resolving
moral conflicts in politics helps highlight an important weakness that all
three share in common. They all neglect the value of deliberation. They do
not explicitly recognize the value of engaging in a give and take of
arguments and understandings before making a political decision.
Deliberation is a value that theorists of dispute resolution rightly take
seriously for some of the same reasons that political theorists also should
explicitly value the role of deliberation in a framework for responding to
moral conflicts in politics. As I discuss below, the value of deliberation in
resolving moral conflicts is both instrumental and noninstrumental;
deliberation helps parties to a moral conflict arrive at more morally
defensible resolutions, and it also expresses the basic democratic value of
mutual respect among free and equal citizens.
A second problem with the three major frameworks in political theory
that I explore below is shared by some of the dominant frameworks of
dispute resolution. The three frameworks neglect the need to combine
morally defensible conditions (or what is commonly called "process") and
morally defensible content (or what is commonly called "substance") when
responding to a moral conflict in politics.2 Moral conflicts are best resolved
by a process that establishes morally defensible conditions for dispute
resolution and arrives at an outcome whose content is morally defensible.3
The terms of deliberation need not be explicitly moral. It may be more
effective to avoid explicitly moral language in many deliberations. But the
criteria that we use for identifying a justifiable resolution to a moral conflict
must be moral, and moral criteria extend to both the conditions under
which a decision is reached and the content of the decision itself, the means
and the ends of decisionmaking. There is no morally neutral way of
resolving a moral conflict in politics, either procedurally or substantively.
The rest of this Essay explores the implications of the impossibility of
moral neutrality. The most basic implication is that any response to a moral
2 See id. at 4 ("The moral authority of collective judgments about policy depends
in part on the moral quality of the process by which citizens collectively reach those
judgments.").
3 See id. at 199-229.
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conflict in politics must be justified on moral terms that encompass both the
means and the ends of the response.
II. LETTING THE MAJORITY DECIDE
Let us begin with the most popular procedural understanding of how to
resolve moral conflicts: let the majority decide. To count as a minimally
moral procedure, majoritarianism must say more than "let the majority
decide." All majoritarians do say more. The most defensible frameworks
insist that a society enfranchise all resident adults, that they secure their
freedoms of speech and association, that they secure due process of law,
and that they secure the other conditions that help to ensure that the
electorate is inclusive and the will of the majority is real rather than
manipulated. If, as is the case in every representative democracy, political
representatives are elected to resolve political disputes on behalf of ordinary
citizens, the representatives must be accountable to the people in whose
name they decide.
The great virtue of majoritarianism is that its voting procedures express
the idea that all adults are free and equal citizens. To see the limits of
majoritarianism as a decisionmaking procedure, let us suppose that the
basic conditions of a fair majoritarian procedure for resolving a moral
conflict are in place. The decision of a majority (or their accountable
representatives) at any particular time resolves the moral conflict as a
matter of law or policy.
What is the strongest justification for the majoritarian framework for
resolving moral conflicts in politics? Only majority rule on its face treats
everyone as equal. To let a minority decide is not to accord equal respect to
the moral claims of each person. This answer is good as far as it goes but it
does not go far enough. It creates a problem for majoritarianism taken on
its own terms. The problem is that majority rule may not, and often does
not, respect the moral claims of each person, which is its basic moral
premise. It is especially vulnerable to neglecting the moral claims of
members of a minority. A simple example can clarify this problem and the
way it should influence our search for a more justifiable response to moral
conflict in politics.
Imagine yourself with four other people in a railway car. I am one of
the four other people.4 None of us can leave, some of us wish to smoke,
and some of us object to anyone smoking in our presence. How should the
4 See id. at 11-51 (providing further analysis of the railway car examples).
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conflict be resolved? Majoritarianism has a simple answer: "Let's vote."
The appeal of letting majority preference determine the outcome, as Brian
Barry describes it in his essay Is Democracy Special?, is that
quite persuasive arguments can be made for saying that the decision
should not simply reflect the number of people who want to smoke as
against the number who dislike being in the presence of smokers. But,
since opposing principles can be advanced, the existence of relevant
principles does not seem to offer a sound basis for resistance to a majority
decision. 5
Barry imagines the Archbishop of Canterbury among us, claiming "the
right to decide the smoking question on the basis either of his social
position or on the basis of his presumptive expertise in casuistry."6 If some
of us reject his claim, how should the question be settled except by a vote?
If the Archbishop finds himself in the minority, he has failed to convince
enough of us that he is right or that he has the right to decide. He may
insist that his view should have been accepted, but in the face of actual
rejection of the minority views, the case for deferring to the majority
decision still looks strong.
Does the case for simple majority rule look as strong if we start to
introduce some realistic complexity into the railway car example? Consider
this variant on the original example. Two passengers-you and I-argue as
follows: "Nonsmokers should not be subject to the substantial health risks
of passive smoking, and smokers are also harming themselves by smoking.
So it is in no one's interests to smoke in this railway car." The vote is
taken, and we, the two health-minded passengers, lose, three to two. If the
health risks are minor and uncertain, the case for majority rule still looks
strong. But if you and I have severe cases of asthma, and the risks to our
lives are great, the case for majority rule weakens. Our confidence in
majority rule declines as the health risks increase in severity and likelihood.
The appeal of majoritarianism depends on conditions of moral conflicts
in politics that are rarely satisfied. One condition is that a majority must not
ignore people's vital interests, and more precisely, their basic liberties and
opportunities. Decisions that violate basic liberty and opportunity cannot be
justified simply by virtue of the fact that they result from majority rule.
Majority rule may still be the best procedural standard for resolving many
5 BRIAN BARRY, Is Democracy Special?, in DEMOCRACY, POWER AND JUSTICE:
EsSAYs IN POLITCAL THEORY 24, 30 (1989).
6Id.
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political disputes, but there is no reason to believe that it is a sufficient
standard.
mI. DELIBERATING BEFORE DECIDING
To say that majority rule is not a sufficient standard presupposes that
some more sufficient standard can be found that is constrained or constrains
itself in a way that reduces the chances of decisions that violate basic
liberties and opportunities of individuals. How can any process be
constrained or constrain itself to reduce the chances that the resulting
decisions will violate basic liberties and opportunities of individuals?
Let us consider the railway car example once again and modify it
slightly. Suppose you are a doctor and have specialized knowledge about
the health risks of smoking. I am a political philosopher and have no
specialized knowledge. I am undecided about whether smoking should be
permitted in the car. I want to hear more from you about the pros and cons
of the issue before I vote. And I want other people to hear what you have to
say as well. No one objects to majority rule, but you and I object to the
idea of simply taking a vote. We both think it important to discuss the
substance of the question before anyone casts a vote.
Procedural principles such as majority rule are silent about the
following aspects of decisionmaking that often are of critical moral
importance in politics: the evidence, arguments, and claims that are
considered before a vote is taken. It would be a serious mistake to judge
conflict resolution only by its voting rules and not also by how the
decisionmaking is designed and by whether decisionmakers are encouraged
to deliberate about their disagreements before voting.
When we judge moral conflict resolution in politics, we should pay
attention to what kind of discussions take place, who engages in them, the
quality of their arguments, and whether and how people respond to each
other. Deliberation is an indispensable part of any political process that
seeks justifiable resolutions to moral disagreements. It is indispensable for
at least two important reasons. One reason is instrumental: deliberation
increases the chances of arriving at morally good outcomes. The second is
noninstrumental: by their willingness and ability to take their opponents'
views seriously, participants in a moral conflict demonstrate mutual respect
for one another. Such mutual respect is intrinsically valuable within a
democracy, because democracy itself rests on the ideal of government
expressing respect for the moral claims of each person.
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Most versions of proceduralism do not so much reject as neglect
deliberation. They fail to recognize how morally important it is for
decisionmakers to engage in the give and take of discussion, reason giving,
and evidence sharing before they make their decisions, whatever vote-
counting method they use. Frameworks of dispute resolution typically are
far better in making explicit the importance of engaging in a deliberative
process, which entails back and forth discussion, reason giving, and
evidence sharing among the disputing parties or their representatives.
Among the procedural steps that Roger Fisher, Elizabeth Kopelman, and
Andrea Kupfer Schneider recommend in Beyond Machiavelli for trying to
resolve conflicts are to "step into their shoes" and to "find good reasons for
what others are doing." 7
But there are also limits to what can count as morally good reasons,
and these are less well recognized-sometimes not recognized at all-by
defenders of dispute resolution. Fisher and his colleagues consider the
example of the paramilitary Serbs in July 1993. 8 From the paramilitary
Serb perspective, the bad consequences of yielding to the United Nations'
demand for a cease-fire included the following responses: (1) "I abandon
the cause of Greater Serbia for which many have died"; (2) "We gain no
more territory"; (3) "We will have to yield some territory won in battle";
and (4) "The [United Nations] may arrest and try me as a war criminal."9
The only good consequence from the perspective (as Fisher imagines it) of
the paramilitary Serbs is that "[tihe terrible fighting stops."10 So far, there
is nothing to be said against, and everything to be said in favor of,
understanding the perspective of the disputants on the Serb side of the
conflict. The problem emerges when we ask: where should we go from
here?
The aim of Fisher's dispute resolution technique is for those of us who
oppose the paramilitary Serbs to find a proposal that for them, as for us, is
"yesable."" 1 By "yesable," Fisher means two things. One is an important
insight of Fisher's technique: the proposal is concrete enough that the other
side can simply say "yes" and does not need to construct its own terms
from scratch (or ideally even modify our terms).' 2 But another thing that
7 ROGER FISHER ET AL., BEYOND MACHIAVELLI 64 (1994).
8 See id.
9 Id. at 65.
10 Id.
11Id. at 96.
12 See id. at 97.
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Fisher means is less explicit: the proposal need only be agreeable to both
sides to yield a resolution. 13 Agreement is a necessary and sufficient
standard of dispute resolution, according to Fisher's framework. 14 In other
words, Fisher's framework of dispute resolution is not a moral one. It does
not claim or even aim to yield a fair resolution.
The problem with Fisher's framework is that it is not difficult to
imagine a situation where a "yesable" proposal is presented to the Serb
paramilitary forces that is morally indefensible. A "yesable" proposal could
be one that appeases Slobodan Milosevic and radically discounts the vital
interests of the Kosovo Albanians. In what sense should we say that under
such conditions the moral conflict is "resolved"? A proposal that is
"yesable" on Fisher's terms is not necessarily a justifiable proposal, and a
moral conflict that is "resolved" on immoral terms is not really resolved.
We could say that the fighting has ended, but we cannot say that the moral
conflict is thereby resolved.
To his credit, Fisher makes this clear when he discusses the way his
framework does not necessarily integrate ethical standards, 15 but in making
it clear, he does not follow the logical implications for dispute resolution
that remains so purely procedural. Fisher makes clear that one cannot
dismiss ethical standards simply because people disagree about them:
"Ethical standards, like legal ones, cannot be dismissed as irrelevant
because of differences of opinion."1 6 This is a great advance over moral
subjectivism. The problem is that Fisher does not draw the logical lesson
from his own insight. "Yesable" proposals may be morally indefensible and
therefore bad, indeed pernicious, proposals. His framework remains too
purely proceduralist.
The insight that Fisher shares with most deliberative democrats is that
many moral differences are reasonable ones, which best can be resolved by
deliberative means. 17 A lot of conflict is not bad but rather is productive of
a better state of affairs than would be the case in the absence of conflict.
This is because people can learn from their differences and in so learning
can arrive at better resolutions to moral conflicts in politics (as in personal
life) than had their differences never come to light.' 8 In Democracy and
13 See id.
14See id.
15 See id. at 111.
16 Id.
17 See id. at 111-12.
18 See id.
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Disagreement, Dennis Thompson and I discuss the case of the Oregon
Health Services Commission ("Commission"), which, after an extensive
process of public deliberation, produced a better outcome-including
greater awareness of how poorly the health care needs of poor citizens were
being met, thereby placing pressure on the legislature to increase and
improve health care funding for poor citizens-than was the case when the
Commission relied upon an expert panel of policy analysts. 19
"Differences can be a source of value," Fisher writes. 20 Any defender
of deliberation should agree. But we all should also explicitly recognize, as
Fisher does not, that differences in politics-when they are of the sort that
divide the paramilitary Serbs, the Kosovo Albanians, the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO), and the United States-can be a source not of
value but of grave injustice, the source of policies of appeasement of those
engaged in ethnic cleansing, or the source of a war whose means and ends
are extremely difficult to assess ahead of time. The point is not to criticize
dispute resolutions that try to end such conflicts. Quite the contrary, trying
to end such conflicts is often a noble cause. The point is that depending on
what the opposing sides are willing to do in response to their differences,
the response to the conflict may or may not be justified even if it is a
"yesable" response in Fisher's terms. The terms are amoral, and therefore
leave the door fairly wide open to agreements that further rather than fight
injustice.
Another way of putting this same point is that the best alternative to a
negotiated agreement (BATNA) in politics sometimes may be very costly in
political terms for the public officials who are in charge of the negotiations.
But the BATNA may still be a morally better response than continued
negotiations-to a ruthless tyrant, for example, who has demonstrated that
he is intent on engaging in ethnic cleansing unless he is forcibly prevented
from doing so. An immoral negotiated resolution to a moral conflict in
politics may be worse than going to war or no resolution at all.
All proceduralists agree that procedures should be constrained by
procedural values such as free speech. But if our aim is to resolve moral
conflict as justifiably as possible, we should not limit ourselves to
procedural constraints. The railway car example shows that some decisions
consistent with procedural constraints-imposing life-threatening health
risks on a few people for the sake of satisfying the preferences of the
greater number-may not be justified. When we move into the real world,
19 See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 143.
20 FISHER ET AL., supra note 7, at 143.
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it is all the more important to recognize this. Insisting on respect for the
freedom of religion of minorities, for example, is not a procedural
constraint on conflict resolution. Yet it is an important constraint to
consider when the conflict threatens freedom of religion. Conversely, some
procedural resolutions of the conflict in Kosovo-such as giving in to
Milosevic's demands for a cease-fire without any assurance of security for
the Kosovo Albanians-could be worse than no resolution at all.
The railway car example shows that we need to attend to the content of
the conflict to assess the justifiability of both the means of reaching a
resolution and the resolution itself. When considering how to resolve moral
conflicts, the core ideal of democracy-that everybody's moral claims be
respected-requires us to assess the morality of the claims that people
within a conflict make, and not only to assess the procedure by which the
conflicts may be resolved. A conception of conflict resolution can and
should do better than to be only procedural. This point-of a conception of
deliberative democracy that integrates standards of both means and ends-is
paralleled by frameworks of conflict resolution that, unlike Fisher's, are
explicitly moral. Joseph Stulberg presents such an alternative framework of
dispute resolution in Fairness and Mediation.21
IV. MAXIMIZE SOCIAL WELFARE
Let us now consider another, less procedural response to moral
conflict: utilitarian policy analysis.22 Utilitarian policy analysis seeks to
maximize social welfare. Utilitarianism works very well when there exists a
Pareto optimal resolution to a moral conflict, a resolution in which one or
more people are made better off and no one is made worse off. But there
are precious few Pareto optimal solutions to moral conflicts in politics.
(And when more than one exists, there is another problem of choosing
among them. I will not pursue this problem because the other problem is so
much more serious for politics.)
Maximizing social welfare seems to be a morally attractive goal for
policy makers who are faced with moral conflicts because it requires them
to follow the seemingly democratic Benthamite rule: count everyone's
interests as one and no one's as more than one. Although this seems to be a
very democratic method, it fails as a defensible substitute to proceduralism,
21 See Joseph B. Stulberg, Fairness and Mediation, 13 OmHO ST. J. ON Disp.
RESOL. 909, 909-10 (1998).
22 See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 165-98 (discussing utilitarian
policy analysis).
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and it is not even a defensible supplement to it in those cases where what is
at issue is whose interests are to be counted and how the satisfaction of
interests across individuals is to be distributed.
Consider the conflict in the United States Congress over subsidizing
abortion. Since the Roe v. Wade23 decision in 1973, Congress has voted
more than hundreds of times on abortion. Many of these votes have been
about abortion funding for poor women. The rule-deliberate before
deciding (and then reiterate deliberation, if the moral conflict persists)-is a
good one. But it alone does not tell us what the content of the standards or
arguments offered to resolve the conflict should be. Deliberative
frameworks undermine their claim to provide more justifiable resolutions to
moral conflicts than nondeliberative frameworks if they say that the content
of the deliberation does not matter. Why then bother to deliberate in the
first place? We could just as well save ourselves a lot of time, flip a coin,
and get on with whatever the coin toss tells us to do. One important reason
to engage in deliberation is to reach more justifiable decisions. As
deliberators, we therefore need to bring some standards to the
deliberations.
Utilitarians sensibly say that flipping a coin would be irrational in most
cases. We instead should engage in a cost-benefit analysis and make the
most cost-effective use of government funds. This too sounds sensible. And
it sometimes is sensible. But utilitarian policy analysis often begs rather
than answers the question of how to resolve a moral conflict on terms that
are as defensible as they can be to the people who will be bound by the
resolution.
Here is a vivid example of a deliberative argument whose content is a
kind of cost-benefit analysis and which illustrates the inappropriateness of
cost-benefit analysis for resolving some kinds of moral conflicts in politics.
In an early floor debate on renewal of the Hyde Amendment, which
restricted abortion funding under Medicaid to abortions that threatened the
life of the mother, Representative William Dannemeyer made a cost-
effectiveness argument against funding abortions. This is what he said:
If we are going to pay off this debt, somebody has got to be born to
pay the taxes to pay it off. Now, since 1973, the decline in the birth rate
per fertile female has reached the point where, as a civilization, we run
the serious risk of disappearing from the face of this planet.
Right now, today, in the last few years, the rate of reproduction per
fertile female is 1.8. Now, demographers tell us we need 2.1 to sustain a
23 410 U.S. 959 (1973).
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civilization. If we keep on at this rate by the year 2050, the number of
people in this country will begin to decline in absolute terms. The
percentage of elderly will rise and the percentage of young will decline.
Our social security system is in a growing peril ...
The economic consequences of a moral issue should not be permitted
to resolve the matter, but at the same time, to ignore them completely is
not a correct discharge of our responsibilit[ies].24
Representative Barbara Mikulski passionately and reasonably replied:
Mr. Chairman, I am just appalled at what the last speaker said. I had
an outline of remarks to be made, but now I am shocked to hear that
American women are meant to be breeder reactors to sustain civilization
and pay off the deficit. I am insulted-insulted-by the use of the language
that was used here in this debate.
We are talking about matters of life, we are talking about the right to
an abortion that has been allowed under the Constitution of the United
States. And then to refer to American women as fertile females that need
to sustain the civilization is an affront to us. I think American women do
more than breed; I think that American women do more than pay off the
deficit. We have already paid our share and pay our dues. We are not
even included in the Constitution of the United States. But, boy, we sure
know how to stick it to the American women in the appropriations? 5
Even on its own utilitarian terms, Representative Dannemeyer's reasoning
is faulty. Funding abortions is likely to be much cheaper for the
government than not doing so. The cost of an abortion is a small fraction of
the cost of childbirth, and other costs and benefits-such as adoption,
welfare, and much more-would need to be taken into account before a
conclusion could be reached on utilitarian terms as to whether to fund
abortions for poor women.
But this is not the main problem with Dannemeyer's argument or with
the utilitarian framework for conflict resolution more generally. Even if we
suppose that the costs of childbirth are greater than those of abortion, this
in itself would not be a sufficient reason to favor funding abortions. The
utilitarian calculus of costs and benefits is not an adequate way to resolve
the conflict over funding abortions and many other moral conflicts because
the calculus cannot even get started until we decide whose interests are to
24 129 CoNG. Rac. 25,409-10 (1983); see also GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra
note 1, at 82-83.
25 129 CONG. REc. 25,410 (1983).
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be included in it.
The utilitarian framework does not give us a justifiable decision on
whether and how the unborn and future generations more generally should
be included in the calculus. If we include the unborn and future
generations, the utilitarian conclusion will be very different from the
conclusions of a calculus that excludes the unborn partially or completely.
We cannot simply assume that producing more people in the world is better
as long as they maximize the happiness in the world. If we did assume this,
then we could justify using women as "breeder reactors." 26 Take away this
unjustified assumption, and utilitarianism is not an adequate framework for
resolving many moral conflicts even within an established democratic
process such as legislative decisionmaking.
V. RESPECT INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
Constitutional democrats offer an antidote to both proceduralism and
utilitarianism: respect for individual rights. A justifiable resolution to a
moral conflict, they argue, should respect as far as possible the moral
claims of every individual-not just those of the majority. A decision
procedure will therefore be more justifiable to the extent that it is
constrained or constrains itself to respect the rights-the basic liberties and
opportunities-of individuals. This is a substantive standard of moral
conflict resolution. It parallels what Stephen Goldberg, Frank Sanders, and
Nancy Rogers call rights-based mediation, which they aptly contrast to
interest-based mediation.27
The major strength of the substantive standard-respect individual
rights-is the recognition that some procedurally correct decisions may not
be justifiable even though they are procedurally correct. Chamberlain's
appeasement of Hitler is one historical example. A negotiated settlement of
the Kosovo conflict that completely discounts the vital interests of the
Kosovo Albanians would be another, if some better alternative is available
(and we cannot exclude the alternative of continued fighting). Unjustifiable
alternatives include those that fail to secure as far as possible the most basic
liberties or opportunities of the individuals who are most affected by the
ongoing conflict and its resolution. The aim of protecting individual rights
26 Id.
27 See STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DIsPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION,
MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 104 (1992).
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is a necessary part of any justifiable framework for resolving moral
conflicts.
But it is not sufficient, and neither, therefore, is a purely rights-based
framework of response to moral conflict. The problem with relying on the
invocation of protecting individual rights is that many moral conflicts in
politics are about precisely this: what are the rights that must be protected?
What does protecting basic liberties require of us in practice? To answer
this question, we need to go back into the railway car. Suppose you and I
vote against smoking. The majority votes to permit smoking. Does this
count as violating our basic rights, protecting the rights of smokers, or
neither? Are my rights violated if smoking is likely to cause me to get
moderately sick? Or only if it causes me to get violently ill? Or only if I
will die? Does it matter if I am the only asthmatic? Would it make a moral
difference if you also share the same nonlife-threatening problem with me,
but we are both still in the minority?
These questions about what constitutes our basic liberties and
opportunities have direct parallels in actual politics: do public policies that
limit environmental pollution protect a basic liberty (to breathe clean air) or
violate a basic liberty (to protect property owners from uncompensated
takings)? How clean does the air need to be to protect our basic liberty to
breathe clean air? Do the numbers of people who are likely to die from
cancer matter? Is avoiding one cancer death enough to justify pollution
controls? Or consider an even more contentious issue these days: is it
within the rights of a public university to use race as one criteria among
many to choose a student body, as Justice Powell argued in the Regents of
the University of California v. Bakke decision?28 Or does the use of race for
the sake of diversity violate the rights of students who are therefore denied
admission, as Judge Smith argued for the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit in the Hopwood v. Texas decision?29 If you think that
the Hopwood decision was wrong, what about the Bakke decision? Was
Justice Powell correct in arguing that racial quotas violate rights but racial
goals do not?30 Was he right to argue that race can be one among many
28 See Bakke v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 438 U.S. 265, 318 (1978) (stating that
"[n]o ... facial [intent to discriminate] exists in an admissions program where race or
ethnic background is simply one element-to be weighed fairly against other elements-
in the selection process").
29 See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996) ("[T]he classification
of persons on the basis of race for the purpose of diversity frustrates, rather than
facilitates, the goals of equal protection.").
30 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315-18.
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criteria but not the sole criteria for university admissions?31 A framework
of securing individual rights must take a position on these issues, but any
position will re-create the moral conflict involved here rather than resolve
it.
Whether it is the problem of environmental pollution or affirmative
action, the core problem is not simply that we need more facts to resolve
these conflicts. More information would no doubt help. For example, the
publication of William Bowen and Derek Bok's path-breaking empirical
study on affirmative action in selective universities, The Shape of the River,
helps resolve some contentious issues surrounding affirmative action,32 but
it does not by itself resolve the moral conflict. (One of the great virtues of
the symposium issue of the Ohio State Law Journal, Twenty Years After
Bakke, is that it raises as many questions concerning rights and affirmative
action as it answers. 33) Even with the most complete information that we
can obtain, someone still has to decide whether and why a certain type of
affirmative action or a certain level of risk of environmental pollution does
or does not violate individual rights.
We should expect wide differences of reasonable opinion about these
and many other important issues concerning basic liberty and opportunity.
Do our basic liberties include the legalization or prohibition of prostitution,
capital punishment, and drugs (and which drugs)? Do our basic
opportunities include the funding of abortion for poor women and the
legalization of affirmative action (and for which groups)? Even if we can
agree on the need for rights to welfare, health care, education, and police
protection, we cannot agree on how much health care, education, and
police protection is enough to respect individual rights. A rights-based
framework for resolving moral conflicts in politics is necessary but not
sufficient.
VI. COMBINING PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE STANDARDS
We should be suspicious of any framework of conflict resolution that
promises us determinate answers to these and many other questions that
create moral conflict in democratic politics. We should be equally
31 See id. at 318, 320.
32 See WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM
CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS 275-
90 (1998).
33 See generally Symposium, Twenty Years After Bakke: The Law and Social
Science of Affinnative Action in Higher Education, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 663 (1998).
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suspicious of any framework that is purely procedural and therefore rejects
substantive constraints such as respect for basic liberty and opportunity
unless it offers us a good moral argument for so doing. We should seek and
support the best possible deliberative procedures for resolving moral
conflicts in politics, and we should also recognize-barring an argument
that shows otherwise-that the most justifiable deliberative procedures are
not only procedural or only rights-based. If deliberative procedures, basic
liberties, and opportunities are not at issue, a calculation of costs and
benefits may be entirely appropriate (and it may even be appropriate as a
possible way of collectively deciding how to judge the merits of competing
procedures, liberties, or opportunities).
How moral conflicts are resolved is a matter of moral importance. Part
of the moral importance is instrumental: the extent to which decisionmakers
reach a resolution that respects the basic liberties and opportunities of
individuals matters. Part of the moral importance is intrinsic to the
deliberative process itself: the extent to which the decisionmakers mutually
respect one another and consider what the people who will be most affected
by their resolution have to say. Both the moral importance of mutual
respect and the incentive to be mutually respectful increase with our
interdependence over time. If the railway car passengers are also fellow
citizens outside the car, their incentive to cultivate mutual respect inside the
car will be greater. Finding ways of increasing the incentives to cultivate
mutual respect is important because, even apart from its instrumental value
in producing better decisions, there is a moral value to the expression of
mutual respect among free and equal beings.
A deliberative framework for responding to moral conflicts, as the
railway car examples suggest, needs to combine both procedural and
substantive standards. The starting premise of a deliberative framework is
that moral conflicts can be resolved only on morally defensible terms.
Moral terms, as we have seen, are both procedural and substantive. (The
dichotomy between process and substance itself is misleading, but that is
the subject of another paper. 34)
In the domain of moral conflict in politics, it is therefore a serious
moral mistake to respond as ambiguously as Roger Fisher and William Ury
do in Getting to Yes to the question: "Should I be fair if I don't have to
be?" 35 They respond: "We do not suggest that you should do good for the
34 See Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, Why Deliberative Democracy Is
Different, 17 Soc. P~m. & POL'Y (forthcoming 2000).
3 5 ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETING TO YEs: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHouT
GIVING IN 154 (Bruce Patton ed., 2d ed. 1991).
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sake of being good (nor do we discourage it) .... [S]ometimes you may
have an opportunity to get more than you think would be fair. Should you
take it? In our opinion, not without careful thought."36 He goes on to ask:
"How much is the difference worth to you?" 37
"Should I be fair even I don't have to be?" should not be a difficult
question for a theorist of conflict resolution in politics to answer. Politics is
about wielding power over other people, and surely those other people are
entitled to a justification for the power that is wielded over them. Milosevic
should be fair, even if he does not have to be, and even if he cannot be
forced to be. So should NATO and the United States be fair, as fair as they
can be to the people whose lives are most affected by their political
decisions. Each and every one of us should be fair when we make political
decisions, decisions that are binding on other people. Fair does not mean
self-effacing. Fair means taking everyone's-including our own-legitimate
interests into account in deciding.
Standards of, dispute resolution, both procedural and substantive, are
often morally controversial. The fact that a standard is controversial, as
Fisher recognizes, is no reason to reject it. But it is a reason to recognize
that including standards of protecting basic liberties and opportunities as
part of a framework for resolving moral conflicts in politics is no more
problematic on its face than including only procedural standards such as
looking behind people's opinions to their interests. The question in both
cases is whether these standards are the best we can do in designing a
framework for guiding moral resolutions of moral conflicts in politics. One
important reason among many for accepting a deliberative framework is
that it explicitly includes a standard of subjecting itself to deliberative
dispute. That dispute must allow for both procedural and substantive
reasons for accepting, rejecting, or revising the proposed framework.
We have no better alternative than to deliberate with one another and
our fellow citizens about how we most justifiably can resolve moral
conflicts. In deliberating, we have no better alternative than to consider
both procedural and substantive standards. Sometimes these standards may
conflict, as when a majority decides to violate what you take to be a basic
liberty, in which case you can assess the relative value of conflicting
standards within a deliberative process. You can do so without prejudging
whether the deliberative result-permission to smoke on the railway car,
for example-takes priority over your moral assessment of the result, that
36 Id. at 154-55.
37 Id. at 155.
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smoking violates a vital interest of some passengers without furthering an
equally vital interest of the majority. You also can judge the deliberative
process itself by how well it affirms and supports standards-such as
procedural fairness in deliberating and respect for the vital interests of
individuals-that both support the process and also inform it.
VII. CONCLUSION
Returning to the question with which I began: what is a justifiable way
of resolving moral conflicts in politics? Of one conclusion I am confident:
there is no easy answer. I have offered some reasons that help explain why
this is so and why three of the most common answers to this question are
inadequate in different ways and to differing degrees. I also have suggested
that when we seek a resolution to moral conflicts in politics, we should
seek a moral resolution in both procedural and substantive senses of the
term moral. This is not to assume that there is one and only one justifiable
resolution of a moral conflict. Quite the contrary, there often are multiple
moral resolutions. But not all ways of settling moral conflicts are moral.
When we judge people who wield political power, or who advise people
who wield political power, we should expect them not just to find a way to
settle or stop the conflicts. We should expect them to reach a moral
resolution if at all possible: one that is justifiable (as far as possible) to the
people who will be bound by the resolution. If public officials cannot reach
a moral resolution, it is not at all obvious that stopping a conflict is better
than letting it continue.
People with power often have a personal interest in convincing us that a
moral resolution to a moral conflict is not possible. But the very act of
trying to persuade us that they could not possibly find a moral resolution
pays homage to the view that seeking (and offering) a moral response to
moral conflict is desirable, if only it is possible. Deliberative dispute
resolution in politics, guided by procedural and substantive standards, does
not call for moral perfection any more than it calls for peace on any terms.
Instead, it calls upon people who wield political power to find ways, moral
ways, to avoid the ever-present possibility of-and temptation toward-
injustice in politics. There are no other ways to avoid injustice but moral
ways, and these ways bring considerations of process and substance, means
and ends, together through deliberation.
We even need to deliberate in order to know when not to deliberate.
When will deliberation no longer work? When is it better not to deliberate?
In many situations, deliberation may be the best alternative. But is there a
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better way to justify not deliberating-and therefore not engaging in the
actual process of mutual justification-than by deliberating and thereby
justifying the absence of deliberation to the people who will be bound by
the (nondeliberative) decision? The best chance of resolving moral conflicts
in politics is to deliberate about the morality of means and ends, including
the morality of not deliberating in some situations.
